Мобильные игры с заработком реальных денег
D мобильные игры с заработком реальных денег, of course, the option of confessing. So Player I confesses, and then Player II also confesses, yielding the same outcome as in the strategic-form representation. What has happened here intuitively is that Player I realizes that if he plays C (refuse to confess) at node 1, then Player II will be able to maximize her utility by suckering him and playing D.
He therefore defects from the agreement. This will often not be true of other games, however. As noted earlier in this section, sometimes we must represent simultaneous moves within games that are otherwise sequential.
Consider the following tree: The oval drawn around nodes b and c indicates that they lie within a common information set. This means that at these nodes players cannot infer back up the path from whence they came; Player II does not know, in choosing мобильные игры с заработком реальных денег strategy, whether she is at b or c. But you will recall from earlier in this section that this is just what defines two moves as simultaneous.
Симпсоны игра деньги can thus игра фермы на реальные деньги that the method of representing games as trees is entirely general. If no node after the initial node is alone in an information set on its tree, so that the game has only one subgame (itself), then the whole game is one of simultaneous play.
If at least one node shares its information set with another, while others are alone, the game involves both simultaneous and sequential play, and so is still a game of imperfect information.
Only if all information sets are inhabited by just one node do we have a game of perfect information. Following the general practice in economics, game theorists refer to the solutions of games as equilibria. In both classical mechanics and in economics, equilibrium concepts are tools for analysis, not predictions of what we expect to observe. However, as we noted in Section купить игру секрет денег екатеринбург. For them, a solution to a game must be an outcome that мобильные игры с заработком реальных денег rational agent would predict using the mechanisms of rational computation alone.
The interest of philosophers in game theory is more often motivated by this ambition than мобильные игры с заработком реальных денег that of the economist or other scientist. A set of strategies is a NE just in case no player could improve her payoff, given the strategies of all other players in the game, by changing her strategy.
Notice how closely this idea is related to the idea of strict dominance: no strategy could be a NE strategy if it is strictly dominated.
Now, almost all theorists agree that avoidance of strictly dominated strategies is мобильные игры с заработком реальных денег minimum requirement of economic rationality.
A player who knowingly chooses a strictly dominated strategy directly violates clause (iii) of the definition of economic agency as given in Section 2. This implies that if a game has an outcome that is a unique NE, as in the case of joint confession in the PD, that must be its unique solution. We can specify one class of games in which NE is always not only necessary but sufficient as a solution concept.]