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Economic theory identifies the maximizing units-economic agents-with unchanging preference fields. Identification of whole biological individuals with such agents is more plausible the less cognitively sophisticated the organism. Thus insects (for example) are tailor-made for easy application of Revealed Preference Theory (see Section 2. As nervous systems become more complex, however, игры нужны деньги 3 на одного encounter animals that learn.
Играть бесплатно в рулетку бесплатно и без регистрации онлайн на русском языке, increasing complexity confounds simple modeling on a second dimension: cognitively sophisticated animals not only change their preferences over time, but are governed by distributed control processes that make them sites of competition among internal agents (Schelling 1980; Ainslie 1992, Ainslie 2001).
Thus they are not straightforward economic agents игры нужны деньги 3 на одного at a time. In setting out to model the behavior of people using any part of economic theory, including game theory, we must recognize that the relationship between any given person and an economic agent we construct for modeling purposes will always be more complicated than simple identity.
There is no sudden crossing point at which an animal becomes too cognitively sophisticated to be modeled игры нужны деньги 3 на одного a single economic agent, and for all animals (including humans) there are contexts in which we can usefully ignore the synchronic dimension of complexity. However, we encounter a phase shift in modeling dynamics when we turn from asocial animals to non-eusocial social ones.
Some known instances are parrots, corvids, bats, rats, canines, hyenas, pigs, raccoons, otters, elephants, hyraxes, cetaceans, игра hungry shark много денег бесплатно primates.
Applications of game theory here can only игры нужны деньги 3 на одного empirically adequate to the extent that the economic modeling is empirically adequate. Individual humans are socially controlled to an extreme degree by comparison with most other non-eusocial species.
At the same time, their great cognitive plasticity allows them to vary significantly between cultures. People are thus the least straightforward economic agents among all organisms. First, however, comments are in order concerning the empirical adequacy of evolutionary game theory to explain and predict distributions of strategic dispositions in populations of agents.
Such modeling is applied both to animals as products of natural selection (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998), and to non-eusocial social animals (but игры нужны деньги 3 на одного humans) as products of cultural selection (Young 1998). There are two main kinds of auxiliary assumptions one игры нужны деньги 3 на одного justify, relative to a particular instance игры на деньги по сети hand, in constructing such applications.
First, one must have grounds for confidence that the dispositions one seeks to explain are (either biological or cultural, as the case may be) adaptations-that is, dispositions that were selected and are maintained because of the way in which they promote their own fitness or the fitness of the wider system, rather than being accidents or structurally inevitable byproducts of other adaptations.
How does cultural evolution feed back into genetic evolution, if it feeds back at all. For a masterful discussion of these issues, see Sterelny 2003.]