Для онлайн игр накрутить деньги
But you will recall from earlier in this section that this is just what defines two moves as simultaneous. We can thus see that the method of representing games as trees is entirely general.
If no node after the initial node is alone in an information set on its tree, so that the game has only one subgame (itself), then the whole game is one of simultaneous play. Для онлайн игр накрутить деньги at least one node shares its information set with another, while others are alone, the game involves both simultaneous and sequential для онлайн игр накрутить деньги, and so is still a game of imperfect information.
Only if all information sets are inhabited by just one node do we have a game of perfect information. Following the general игра в буркозла на деньги in economics, game theorists refer to the solutions of games as equilibria.
In both classical mechanics and in economics, equilibrium concepts are tools for analysis, not predictions of what we expect to observe. However, as we noted in Section 2. For them, a solution to a для онлайн игр накрутить деньги must be an outcome that a rational agent would predict using the mechanisms для онлайн игр накрутить деньги rational computation alone.
The interest of philosophers in game theory is more often motivated by this ambition than is that of the economist or other scientist. A set of strategies is a NE just in case no player could improve her payoff, given the strategies of all other players in the game, by changing her strategy. Notice how closely this idea is related to the idea of strict dominance: no strategy could be a NE strategy if it is strictly dominated.
Now, almost all theorists agree that avoidance of strictly dominated strategies is a для онлайн игр накрутить деньги requirement of economic rationality. A player who knowingly chooses игры в которые можно поиграть на деньги strictly dominated strategy directly violates clause (iii) of the definition of economic agency as given in Section 2.
This implies that if a game has an outcome that is a unique NE, as in the case of joint confession in the PD, that must be its unique solution. We can specify one class of games in which NE is always not играя в игры зарабатывай деньги necessary but sufficient as a solution concept. These are finite perfect-information games that are also zero-sum.
A zero-sum game (in the case of a game involving just two players) is one для онлайн игр накрутить деньги which one player can only be made better off by making the other player worse off. First, there is the problem that in most non-zero-sum games, there is more than one NE, but not all NE look equally plausible as the solutions upon which strategically alert players would hit.
Consider the strategic-form для онлайн игр накрутить деньги below (taken from Kreps (1990), p. But if Player I is playing s1 then Player II can do no better than t1, and vice-versa; and similarly for the s2-t2 pair.
In the case of the game above, both players have every reason to try to converge on the NE in which they are better для онлайн игр накрутить деньги. Consider another example from Kreps (1990), p. So should not the players (and the analyst) delete the weakly dominated row s2.]